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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY
THE RIGHT OF THE MORTGAGOR TO AN APPRAISAL AND THE
RIGHT OF THE MORTGAGEE TO A PUBLIC SALE UNDER
SEC. 75 (s) (3) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT.
The petitioning farmer filed a petition under sec. 75 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and later, on Oct. I1, 1935, amended it, asking to be
adjudged a bankrupt as provided for in sec. 75(s) -1 On July 22, 1938,
respondent filed a petition in accordance with sec. 75(s)(3)2 praying
for an immediate sale and alleging that the debtor's financial condition
was beyond reasonable hope of rehabilitation and that he had failed
to comply with an order of the court. On Oct. 5, 1938, the debtor
filed a cross-petition under sec. 75(s)(3) to have the land appraised
or its value fixed by the court, to be allowed to redeem at that value,
and to be discharged from liability on account of the deficiency.
Respondent answered alleging that by the terms of sec. 75 (s) (3) its
request for sale took precedence over the debtor's right of appraisal.
These contentions framed the issue in the principal case as to whether
the debtor, under sec. 75(s)(3) must be accorded an opportunity,
on his request, to redeem the property at the reappraised value or at
a value fixed by the court before the court might order a public sale.
I x x U.S.C.A. sCe. 203.
2 is U.S.C.A. 203(s), sec. 75(s) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act reads as follows: "At
the end of three years, or prior thereto, the debtor may pay into court the amount or the
appraisal of the property of which he retains possession, including the amount of encum-
berances on his exemptions, up to the amount of the appraisal, less the amount paid on
principal: Provided, That upon request of any secured or unsecured creditor, or upon
request of the debtor, the court shall cause a reappraisal of the debtor's property, or in
its discretion set a date for hearing, and after such hearing, fix the value of the property,
in accordance with the evidence submitted, and the debtor shall then pay the value so
arrived at into court, less payments made on the principal, for distribution to all secured
and unsecured creditors, as their interests may appear, and thereupon the court shall, by
an order, turn over full possession and title of said property, free and clear of encum-
brances to the debtor: Provided, That upon request in writing by any secured creditor or
creditors, the court shall order the property upon which such secured creditors have a lien
to be sold at public auction. The debtor shall have ninety days to redeem any property
sold at such sale, by paying the amount for which any such property was sold, together
with S per centum per annum interest, into court, and he may apply for his discharge, as
provided for by this Act. If, however, the debtor at any time fails to comply with the
provisions of this section, or with any orders of the court made pursuant to this section,
or is unable to refinance himself within three years, the court may order the appointment
of a trustee, and order the property sold or otherwise disposed of as provided for in this
Act."
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At the hearing the court found that there was no reasonable expecta-
tion that the debtor could refinance himself and that he had disobeyed
the orders of the court and accordingly ordered that the property be
sold at public auction. The order was affirmed on appeal.' The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and speaking through Justice Douglas
held the debtor's right to an appraisal superior to the creditor's right
of sale. This result was reached by reconciling the two apparently
inconsistent remedies in the statute' in the light of the purpose of the
Act-farmer rehabilitation-thus giving the farmer the benefit of the
doubt so long as the secured creditor's constitutional right of an interest
to the extent of the value of the property was not impaired. The
mortgagee's right of sale under this statute was interpreted to mean
that this right was available provided the mortgagor did not choose
to take advantage of the appraisal provision. The Court further held
that, even if there were no hope for rehabilitation, and if the debtor
had not complied with the Act or had disregarded court orders, the
court could not absolutely order a public sale, but that the mortgagor
must first be given an opportunity to take advantage of the appraisal
provision.'
A short history of sec. 75(s) is essential here to an understanding
of the problem. The principal case involves the constitutionality of a
section of what is popularly known as the Frazier-Lemke Acte providing
for farm moratoriums. The first Frazier-Lemke Acte was held uncon-
stitutional in the Radford case' solely on the ground that it violated
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Radford case enumer-
ated five substantive right in specific property which had been taken.'
It was not held that the deprivation of any one of these rights would
have made the Act invalid, but that the cumulative effect of the statute
was to deprive the mortgagee of his property without due process of
'Itt re Wright, so8 F. (2d) 361, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. (N.S.) 797 (g939)-
4 Note 2, supra.
'Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., et al., 61 Sup. Ct. 196, 85 L.Ed. 166
(1940).
"Note 1, supra.
"Act of March 3, 1933, 11 U.S.C.A. sec. 2o3.
'Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 Sup. Ct. 854,
79 L.Ed. 1593, 97 A.L.R. iio6 (1934).
"'(i) The right to retain the lien until the indebtedness was paid. (z) The right
to realize upon the security by a judicial sale. (3) The right to determine when such sale
shall be held, subject only to the discretion of the Court. (4) The right to protect its
interest in the property by bidding at such sale whenever held, and thus to assure having
the mortgaged property devoted primarily to the satisfaction of the debt, either through
receipt of the proceeds of a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself. (5) The
right to control meanwhile the property during the period of default, subject only to the
discretion of the court, and to have the rents and profits collected by a receiver for the
satisfaction of the debt."
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law.' The second Frazier-Lemke Act" was passed in an attempt to
eliminate the unconstitutional elements enumerated by the Radford
case. It was held constitutional in the case of Wright v. Vinton Branch
of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke" on the ground that the five
rights-including the right of sale-enumerated in the Radford case
had been sufficiently preserved.
The principal case involves one of these rights--sale by the mort-
gagee. The problem to be discussed here is the extent to which this
right has been altered by the principal case, and what relation the
instant case bears to the .Radford and Vinton cases.
Logically, the statute would seem to make the right of sale man-
datory and unqualified for it seems to state a general rule-that the
farmer shall have the property at the appraised value-with an excep-
tion concerning reappraisal and with the further exception to this
exception that the mortgagee shall have a sale upon his request. The
absence of mention by Justice Brandies in the Vinton case of any
qualification of an absolute right would seem to indicate that he placed
a similar interpretation upon it. This interpretation is sustained by
reference to the history of the statute during enactment by Congress.
As introduced, the bill contained no sale provision.'" To remove a
doubt of constitutionality, the Judiciary Committee, to which it was
referred, added a provision ". . . That upon request in writing by
any secured creditor or creditors, the court in its discretion, if it deems
it for the best interests of the secured creditors and debtor, may order
the property upon which such secured creditors have a lien, to be sold
at public auction; . . ."4 Later, the clause which made the right of
sale discretionary was deleted so as to make the Act read as it does at
present. The purpose of this change, as revealed by the debate on the
bill, was to give "the creditor the right, as a matter of right, to have
a foreclosure of the property in the event his debt had not been paid
in full."" This legislative intent is further shown by the deletion from
the bill as originally reported from the Judiciary Committee of a clause
limiting the right of the mortgagee to bid at the sale to not more than
the appraisal price or the original amount of the loan, whichever was
higher. This change was made to avoid unconstitutionality.' From
"'See Hanover National Bank v. Myses, x86 U.S. 181, 19o, z2 Eup. Ct. 857, 861,
46 L. Ed. 1113, (1120) (1902).
' Note x, supra.
'Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Va., et al., 300
U.S. 440, 57 Sup. Ct. 556, 8 L.Ed. 736, 112 A.L.R. 1455 (1937).
'S 3002, 74th Cong., ist Sess.
'S 3oo2, as reported, sec. 6, p. 9 see Sen. Rep. No. 98S, 74th Cong., ist Sess. p. 4.
iz79 Cong. Rec. 14332, 14333.
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these facts it can be concluded that although the desire and better
judgment of Congress were probably otherwise, the statute was
intended to give an absolute right of sale (including an unqualified
right to bid at such sale) to the mortgagee and that this is the con-
stitutional right which Justice Brandies had in mind in the Vinton case.
. However, Justice Douglas says in the principal case that the rights
of the secured creditors were protected by the Act ".. . to the extent
of the value of the property. There is no constitutional claim of the
creditor to more than that." Again he said, referring to the Vinton
case, "In that case this Court, in sustaining the constitutionality of
sec. 75(s) (3), emphasized that the Act preserved the right of the
mortgagee to realize upon the security by a judicial sale. By our con-
struction the exercise of this right is merely deferred or postponed
until the other conditions and requirements of the Act, prescribed for
the protection of the debtor, have been met. It is eventually denied
the creditor only in case he is paid the full amount of what he can
constitutionally claim." From these statements it seems clear that the
right of the mortgagee has been materially reduced to something less
than the absolute right to a public sale, with a corresponding increase
in the right of the mortgagor-farmer.
It is not with complete assurance that one can state the effect of
the principal case upon the Radford and Vinton cases because in the
Vinton case it was stated that sec. (s) of the first Frazier-Lemke Act
was unconstitutional, not because any one of the five enumerated rights
had been taken away, but because the impairment of all five violated
the due process clause.' But in addition Justice Brandeis said without
qualification that under the second Frazier-Lemke Act the mortgagee
had a right of sale.' This right and an opportunity to bid at such sale
would seem to be the crux of the matter, since without these the rights
of which the Vinton case speaks become a shell. On this hypothesis
the conclusion seems inevitable that here we have in effect a silent
reversal of the Radford case and an equally silent rejection of the
reasoning in the Vinton case.
R. D. S.
"6The bill as originally reported out of committee, S 3002, Sen. Report No. 985,
7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. The debate revealing the reason for the deletion will be found in
79 Cong. Rec. 13633.
'Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Va., et.al., 300
U.S. 440 (457), 57 Sup. Ct. 556 (559), 81 L.Ed. 736 (740) (1937).
'Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Va. et-al., 300
U.S. 440, 457, 57 Sup. Ct. 5s6, S59,81 L.Ed. 736, 740 (1937).
